Approved For Release 2001/03/05 CIA RDP 2-00757R007100630 teement No. Vollhange by C:ass CLASSIFICATION _aclassi F Mas. Changed To: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. 5X1A Arth.: HH 70-2 O'INFORMATION REPORT letter of 16 October 1773 from the Cate: 11.25/0 CD NO. Director of Central Into COUNTRY Korea Archivist of the United Claics. DATE DISTR. 6 March 1951 Storage of Materiel and Morale of Laborers SUBJECT NO, OF PAGES in the Chorwon Area RETURN TO CIA PLACE NO. OF ENCLS. ACQUIRED (LISTED BELOW) 25X1A DATE OF LIBRARY SUPPLEMENT TO INFO. REPORT NO. 25X THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE 25X1X

- In late 1950 a large (undetermined) number of civilian men and women of all ages were conscripted to unload and transport ammunition and supplies in the Yonghak—san (127-143, 38-26) and Kumsong—myon (127-35, 38-26) areas. In January and early February 1951 most of the work of loading or unloading trucks with supplies for the south was carried on at night in railroad tunnels of that area.
- In early February all tunnels of the railroad line between Chorwon (127-12, 38-15) and Marhwiri (127-59, 38-37) were used to store ammunition and supplies or to conceal an undetermined number of tanks. On 5 February approximately seven tanks were in an unidentified tunnel on this line near Kumsong-myon. All tracks of this line were torn-up or not usable and in early February supplies were being taken to and from the tunnel storage places by trucks.
- 3. As of 7 February no tunnels on this line had been bombed by UN aircraft and laborers who were working and living in the tunnels heard few aircraft. The laborers were convinced that a strong defense system had been set up on this railroad line, including a large (undetermined) number of troops and an accumulation of large amounts of weapons, ammunition and other supplies.
- 4. As of 7 February most troops in the area were North Koreans with the exception of a small (undetermined) number of Chinese Communist mechanics and technicians handling and repairing tanks and heavier guns of undetermined caliber.
- 5. The food supplies for the troops were good, since there were abundant stores of rice and other grain. The laborers were fed only a handful of rice daily; the remainder of their ration consisted of corn or other grain (amount unstated).
- 6. In early February members of Communist social or political organizations, particularly from the Seoul area, who fled at the UN occupation of Seoul to work for the North Korean army, became disillusioned

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and hoped to desert the labor battalions. Desertion is difficult, however, because of the constant surveillance and control by North Korean military authorities.

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